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Go
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import ( "bufio" "context" "crypto/ecdsa" "crypto/elliptic" "crypto/rand" "crypto/sha256" "crypto/tls" "crypto/x509" "crypto/x509/pkix" "encoding/base64" "encoding/json" "encoding/pem" "errors" "fmt" "io" "math/big" "net" "net/http" "net/http/httputil" "net/url" "os" "path/filepath" "runtime" "strings" "sync" "syscall" "time"
"stream.place/streamplace/pkg/log")
// e2eHTTPS gives the e2e harness real, locally trusted HTTPS, so the atproto// OAuth flow can run against the local PDS and node unmodified. Neither end// accepts less: the Go OAuth client wants a PDS issuer that is https:// with// no port, the PDS's OAuth provider refuses client IDs and redirect URIs on// .test/.local/.localhost names, and oatproxy and the browser OAuth client// both resolve did:plc against a hardcoded https://plc.directory.//// So, given public DNS records pointing a PDS hostname, everything under it// (account handles) and a station (broadcaster) hostname at 127.0.0.1, the// harness does the following. The two must be on different registrable// domains, as they are in production: the PDS refuses to show its sign-in// page to a same-site navigation (Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site).//// - mints a throwaway CA and one leaf for all of those and plc.directory;// - terminates TLS on 127.0.0.1:443 and routes by SNI: the PDS hostname and// handles to the dev-env PDS, the station hostname to the node's// plain-HTTP listener (it runs with --behind-https-proxy), plc.directory// to the dev-env PLC;// - has the PDS resolve lexicons, the OAuth permission sets among them,// from a local lexicon authority account that the harness publishes this// build's lexicons into (see publishLexicons in e2e.go);// - runs a CONNECT proxy that sends the names above to that listener and// everything else where it was going. The node (HTTPS_PROXY) and the// browser use it, which is how their hardcoded plc.directory lookups land// on the local PLC.//// Nothing is installed system-wide: each process is told to trust the CA on// its own (SSL_CERT_DIR for Go, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS for Node, the leaf's SPKI// for Chromium), and the CA's key is deleted with the run.type e2eHTTPS struct { pdsHost string stationHost string dir string caPath string trustDir string leafPath string keyPath string auditPath string cert tls.Certificate spki string
frontLn net.Listener // 127.0.0.1:443, or whatever loopback 443 redirects to proxyLn net.Listener // CONNECT proxy localProxyLn net.Listener localPDSLn net.Listener}
const e2ePLCHost = "plc.directory"
// newE2EHTTPS mints the certificates and claims every listener up front, so a// harness that cannot bind its port fails before it has started anything else.//// The front end listens on 127.0.0.1:port. The URLs it serves stay portless// (https://<host>), so any port other than 443 only works on a machine that// redirects loopback 443 to it, e.g. with an iptables REDIRECT rule.func newE2EHTTPS(pdsHost, stationHost string, port int) (*e2eHTTPS, error) { h := &e2eHTTPS{pdsHost: pdsHost, stationHost: stationHost} var err error h.dir, err = os.MkdirTemp("", "streamplace-e2e-tls-*") if err != nil { return nil, err } if err := h.mintCerts(); err != nil { h.Close() return nil, fmt.Errorf("mint e2e certificates: %w", err) } addr := fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", port) h.frontLn, err = net.Listen("tcp", addr) if err != nil { h.Close() fix := "run as root (e.g. in the build container)" if errors.Is(err, syscall.EACCES) && runtime.GOOS == "linux" { fix = fmt.Sprintf("run as root, or let unprivileged processes bind it until the next reboot with `sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start=%d`", port) } return nil, fmt.Errorf("listen on %s: %w\nOAuth needs portless https hosts: %s; or leave the --https-* hostnames empty (E2E_HTTPS_PDS_HOSTNAME= for the hack/ runners) to skip HTTPS", addr, err, fix) } if h.proxyLn, err = net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0"); err != nil { h.Close() return nil, err } return h, nil}
func (h *e2eHTTPS) Close() { for _, ln := range []net.Listener{h.frontLn, h.proxyLn, h.localProxyLn, h.localPDSLn} { if ln != nil { ln.Close() //nolint:errcheck } } if h.dir != "" { os.RemoveAll(h.dir) //nolint:errcheck }}
// StationURL and PDSURL are the public https URLs users visit.func (h *e2eHTTPS) StationURL() string { return "https://" + h.stationHost }func (h *e2eHTTPS) PDSURL() string { return "https://" + h.pdsHost }
func (h *e2eHTTPS) ProxyURL() string { return "http://" + h.proxyLn.Addr().String() }
// DevEnvEnv is the extra environment for js/dev-env: the PDS's public// hostname, and trust in our CA for what it fetches over https (the node's// OAuth client metadata, lexicons from its own public URL).func (h *e2eHTTPS) DevEnvEnv() []string { return []string{ "DEV_ENV_PDS_HOSTNAME=" + h.pdsHost, "NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=" + h.caPath, }}
// NodeEnv is the extra environment for the forked node, whose broadcaster// host is the station hostname.func (h *e2eHTTPS) NodeEnv() []string { return append([]string{"SP_BEHIND_HTTPS_PROXY=true"}, h.TrustEnv()...)}
// TrustEnv is what any forked node needs to reach the PDS and PLC at their// HTTPS names: the CA, and the proxy that sends plc.directory to the local// PLC. Go reads SSL_CERT_DIR on top of the system bundle file, so public// roots still work.func (h *e2eHTTPS) TrustEnv() []string { return []string{ "SSL_CERT_DIR=" + h.trustDir, "HTTPS_PROXY=" + h.ProxyURL(), }}
// Serve starts the TLS listeners and the proxy. The backends are the dev-env// PDS and PLC and the node's plain-HTTP listener, as host:port.func (h *e2eHTTPS) Serve(ctx context.Context, pdsAddr, plcAddr, nodeAddr string) { route := func(name string) string { name = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".")) switch { case name == e2ePLCHost: return plcAddr case name == h.stationHost: return nodeAddr case name == h.pdsHost || strings.HasSuffix(name, "."+h.pdsHost): return pdsAddr } return "" } go serveTLSPipe(ctx, h.frontLn, h.cert, route) go serveConnectProxy(ctx, h.proxyLn, func(hostport string) string { host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostport) if err == nil && port == "443" && route(host) != "" { return h.frontLn.Addr().String() } return hostport })}
func (h *e2eHTTPS) mintCerts() error { now := time.Now() caKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) if err != nil { return err } caTmpl := &x509.Certificate{ SerialNumber: randomSerial(), Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "Streamplace e2e throwaway CA"}, NotBefore: now.Add(-time.Hour), NotAfter: now.Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour), KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageCRLSign, BasicConstraintsValid: true, IsCA: true, MaxPathLenZero: true, } caDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTmpl, caTmpl, &caKey.PublicKey, caKey) if err != nil { return err } ca, err := x509.ParseCertificate(caDER) if err != nil { return err }
leafKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) if err != nil { return err } leafTmpl := &x509.Certificate{ SerialNumber: randomSerial(), Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: h.pdsHost}, DNSNames: []string{h.pdsHost, "*." + h.pdsHost, h.stationHost, e2ePLCHost}, IPAddresses: []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}, NotBefore: now.Add(-time.Hour), NotAfter: now.Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour), KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature, ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}, } leafDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTmpl, ca, &leafKey.PublicKey, caKey) if err != nil { return err } leaf, err := x509.ParseCertificate(leafDER) if err != nil { return err } h.cert = tls.Certificate{Certificate: [][]byte{leafDER}, PrivateKey: leafKey, Leaf: leaf} sum := sha256.Sum256(leaf.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo) h.spki = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:])
// The trust dir holds the CA and nothing else: Go parses every file in an // SSL_CERT_DIR entry. h.trustDir = filepath.Join(h.dir, "trust") if err := os.Mkdir(h.trustDir, 0o700); err != nil { return err } h.caPath = filepath.Join(h.trustDir, "ca.pem") return os.WriteFile(h.caPath, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: caDER}), 0o600)}
func randomSerial() *big.Int { n, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 127)) if err != nil { panic(err) } return n}
// serveTLSPipe terminates TLS on ln and pipes the plaintext, byte for byte, to// the backend route picks from the SNI name. Piping rather than proxying HTTP// keeps websockets working and leaves requests exactly as the client sent// them, Host header included (the PDS answers handle lookups by Host).func serveTLSPipe(ctx context.Context, ln net.Listener, cert tls.Certificate, route func(sni string) string) { tlsLn := tls.NewListener(ln, &tls.Config{ Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cert}, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, }) for { conn, err := tlsLn.Accept() if err != nil { if ctx.Err() == nil && !errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) { log.Log(ctx, "e2e tls: accept failed", "addr", ln.Addr(), "err", err) } return } go func() { tc := conn.(*tls.Conn) hsCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 10*time.Second) defer cancel() if err := tc.HandshakeContext(hsCtx); err != nil { conn.Close() //nolint:errcheck return } sni := tc.ConnectionState().ServerName backend := route(sni) if backend == "" { log.Log(ctx, "e2e tls: no backend for server name", "sni", sni, "addr", ln.Addr()) conn.Close() //nolint:errcheck return } upstream, err := net.Dial("tcp", backend) if err != nil { log.Log(ctx, "e2e tls: backend dial failed", "sni", sni, "backend", backend, "err", err) conn.Close() //nolint:errcheck return } pipeConns(conn, upstream) }() }}
// serveConnectProxy is an HTTP CONNECT proxy whose only trick is resolve,// which may send a host:port somewhere other than DNS would.func serveConnectProxy(ctx context.Context, ln net.Listener, resolve func(hostport string) string) { srv := &http.Server{ ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second, Handler: http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if r.Method != http.MethodConnect { http.Error(w, "this proxy only speaks CONNECT", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) return } upstream, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", resolve(r.Host), 10*time.Second) if err != nil { http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadGateway) return } hj, ok := w.(http.Hijacker) if !ok { upstream.Close() //nolint:errcheck http.Error(w, "cannot hijack", http.StatusInternalServerError) return } conn, buf, err := hj.Hijack() if err != nil { upstream.Close() //nolint:errcheck return } if _, err := conn.Write([]byte("HTTP/1.1 200 Connection established\r\n\r\n")); err != nil { conn.Close() //nolint:errcheck upstream.Close() //nolint:errcheck return } pipeConns(&bufferedConn{Conn: conn, r: buf.Reader}, upstream) }), } go func() { <-ctx.Done() srv.Close() //nolint:errcheck }() err := srv.Serve(ln) if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) && !errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) && ctx.Err() == nil { log.Log(ctx, "e2e proxy: serve failed", "err", err) }}
// bufferedConn reads through the bufio.Reader a hijacked connection came// with, in case the client pipelined bytes behind its CONNECT.type bufferedConn struct { net.Conn r *bufio.Reader}
func (c *bufferedConn) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.r.Read(p) }
// pipeConns copies both ways until either side is done, then closes both.func pipeConns(a, b net.Conn) { var once sync.Once closeBoth := func() { a.Close() //nolint:errcheck b.Close() //nolint:errcheck } go func() { io.Copy(a, b) //nolint:errcheck once.Do(closeBoth) }() io.Copy(b, a) //nolint:errcheck once.Do(closeBoth)}
// BridgeTLS writes the leaf and key only for a real atmoq serve child. Its// station DNS SAN permits verified TLS with the SNI required by raw MoQ.func (h *e2eHTTPS) BridgeTLS() error { // atmoq watches the certificate directory. Keep logs and its cursor outside // it so their writes do not trigger a certificate-reload feedback loop. dir := filepath.Join(h.dir, "atmoq-tls") if err := os.Mkdir(dir, 0o700); err != nil { return err } h.leafPath = filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem") h.keyPath = filepath.Join(dir, "key.pem") if err := os.WriteFile(h.leafPath, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: h.cert.Certificate[0]}), 0o600); err != nil { return err } keyDER, err := x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(h.cert.PrivateKey) if err != nil { return err } return os.WriteFile(h.keyPath, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER}), 0o600)}
// StartLocalProxy forwards genuine local-node PDS requests and records their// method/path/query. The upstream station uses the original proxy, so its// ordinary global indexing cannot mask forbidden local account scraping.// This is harness-only transport observation, not a production test endpoint.func (h *e2eHTTPS) StartLocalProxy(ctx context.Context, pdsURL string) (string, error) { target, err := url.Parse(pdsURL) if err != nil { return "", err } h.auditPath = filepath.Join(h.dir, "local-pds-requests.jsonl") audit, err := os.OpenFile(h.auditPath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_APPEND, 0o600) if err != nil { return "", err } h.localPDSLn, err = net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") if err != nil { audit.Close() //nolint:errcheck return "", err } h.localProxyLn, err = net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") if err != nil { audit.Close() //nolint:errcheck return "", err } reverse := httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy(target) var mu sync.Mutex handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { entry := struct { Method string `json:"method"` Path string `json:"path"` Query string `json:"query"` }{r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.URL.RawQuery} mu.Lock() err := json.NewEncoder(audit).Encode(entry) mu.Unlock() if err != nil { log.Error(ctx, "write local PDS audit", "err", err) http.Error(w, "harness audit failed", http.StatusInternalServerError) return } reverse.ServeHTTP(w, r) }) srv := &http.Server{Handler: handler, ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second} go func() { err := srv.Serve(tls.NewListener(h.localPDSLn, &tls.Config{Certificates: []tls.Certificate{h.cert}, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12})) if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) && !errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) && ctx.Err() == nil { log.Error(ctx, "local PDS observer failed", "err", err) } }() go func() { <-ctx.Done() srv.Close() //nolint:errcheck audit.Close() //nolint:errcheck }() go serveConnectProxy(ctx, h.localProxyLn, func(hostport string) string { host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostport) if err == nil && port == "443" { switch { case host == h.pdsHost || strings.HasSuffix(host, "."+h.pdsHost): return h.localPDSLn.Addr().String() case host == h.stationHost || host == e2ePLCHost: return h.frontLn.Addr().String() } } return hostport }) return "http://" + h.localProxyLn.Addr().String(), nil}