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Identities for entities did.bot
agent llm did
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4.8 kB · 101 lines
Rust
at main
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102//! The granular atproto OAuth scope grammar, parsed into a typed//! representation with intersection and containment operations.//!//! `plan/oauth.md` calls this "the single most important thing" this epic//! produces, because `plan/scope-policy.md` has to intersect a request//! against a per-agent ceiling and report exactly which scope was refused —//! impossible to do correctly over bare strings, where `repo:app.bsky.feed.*`//! and `repo:app.bsky.feed.post` are unrelated text but one contains the//! other. Everything here is inert with respect to policy: this module//! parses the wire grammar, tests whether one [`Scope`] contains another, and//! intersects a requested [`ScopeSet`] against a ceiling `ScopeSet`. It does//! not decide what a ceiling *is* — that is `plan/scope-policy.md`, blocked//! on this and on `policy-store`, and it is deliberately not built here.//!//! # The grammar//!//! Space-separated scope strings, one atom each://!//! - `atproto` — the base scope every atproto OAuth grant carries.//! - `transition:generic`, `transition:chat.bsky`, `transition:email` — the//! legacy, ungranular scopes the spec keeps for compatibility. Each is//! modelled as its own variant rather than desugared into the granular//! scopes it stands in for, because `plan/scope-policy.md` is explicit that//! `transition:*` is the one exception every granular rule has to reckon//! with by name, not the one this module should quietly launder away.//! - `repo:<collection>[?action=create&action=update…]` — write access to//! one collection. Several actions repeat the parameter, as the permission//! spec writes every list parameter; no `action` query means all three.//! - `rpc:<lxm>?aud=<aud>` — permission to call one XRPC method at another//! service: the audience is a DID and a service fragment, with its `#`//! written `%23`, or `*` for every audience.//! - `blob:<mime>`, or `blob?accept=<mime>[&accept=<mime>…]` — permission to//! upload a blob of one MIME type or type prefix. The two spellings are//! the same scope: the positional one names a single type, the `accept`//! one names as many as it repeats. How large a blob may be is not in this//! grammar; it is the operator's, in policy and in the server's blob//! limit.//! - `identity:<attr>` — control of the account's identity://! [`IdentityAttr`] names the handle, or `*` for the whole DID document//! and handle. `plan/scope-policy.md` never grants one.//! - `account:<attr>[?action=<action>]` — the account's hosting://! [`AccountAttr`] names what, and [`AccountAction`] how much, `read` when//! the atom names none. Never granted either.//! - `include:<nsid>[?aud=<did>%23<service>]` — a permission set, published//! as a lexicon. As an atom it admits only itself. [`Include`] reads it,//! and [`Include::grants`] turns the set's published permissions into the//! `repo:` and `rpc:` atoms it grants.//!//! Every value may be percent-encoded, and every positional value may be//! written as a parameter instead: `repo?collection=a&collection=b`,//! `rpc?lxm=*&aud=…`, `identity?attr=handle`, `include?nsid=…`. A list//! parameter names one scope per value, so `repo?collection=a&collection=b`//! reads as `repo:a repo:b`, and that is how it prints.//!//! `mime` patterns may wildcard either half of `type/subtype` (`image/*`//! contains `image/png`).//!//! # Forms the spec does not define//!//! [`ScopeSet::read`] reads an atom written in a form the permission spec//! does not define as well as it can, and says how in a [`ScopeWarning`].//! One such form is a partial wildcard, `some.prefix.*`, which this grammar//! reads as the prefix and every NSID beneath it at any depth: an operator's//! ceiling uses it without a warning.//!//! An atom this grammar cannot read at all — an unknown kind, or a value its//! kind does not define — is kept as [`Scope::Unknown`], which admits only//! itself, rather than failing the whole string. A request carrying one can//! then be judged on the rest. `didbot-serve` never grants one.
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
mod account;mod action;mod error;mod identity;mod include;mod parse;mod pattern;mod read;mod scope;mod set;mod transition;mod warning;
#[cfg(test)]mod tests;
pub use account::{AccountAction, AccountAttr};pub use action::{Action, ActionSet};pub use error::{ ScopeParseError, MAX_ATOM_BYTES, MAX_GRANT_ATOMS, MAX_GRANT_BYTES, MAX_SCOPE_ATOMS, MAX_SCOPE_BYTES,};pub use identity::IdentityAttr;pub use include::{Include, IncludeError};pub use pattern::{MimePattern, NsidPattern};pub use scope::Scope;pub use set::{ScopeRefused, ScopeSet};pub use transition::Transition;pub use warning::ScopeWarning;