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didbot plan dev-setup.md
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dev-setup #

local-dev is the loop once you are in it: five terminals and a swarm. This is getting there. The gap is not the scripts, it is everything around them — a certificate, a name, an edit to the user's harness configuration, and a restart before any of it takes effect.

The shape is a command that asks rather than assumes. It touches a person's settings file and possibly their trust store, so it says what it will do, does the parts it may, and stops with a specific instruction for the parts it may not.

What the shape is #

One set of defaults per machine, in scripts/dev-profile.sh: the port, the zone and the state directory, each overridable from the environment. A second stack on one machine is a second set of those variables, or a second checkout. Each daemon knows its own default state directory under $XDG_STATE_HOME (didbot-agentd's default_state_dir, dev-pds.sh's --data), so nothing has to be told where anything lives before it can start.

Installing an agent host — the daemon's unit file, the plugin, the hooks — is the agent host's installer's job, which is shell owned by the didbot-claude plugin: it writes the unit files and reports whether the plugin is present.

Where accounts come from, and the bootstrap #

Hooks are captured at session start, so a session that installs them is never itself hooked — and neither are its subagents, which inherit the session's captured configuration rather than re-reading disk. A directory is therefore set up from outside it, before a session starts there.

Recovery is a different problem from bootstrap, and a more frequent one: a server that was down when the session opened, or one restarted without --data. SessionStart cannot be replayed, so PreToolUse provisions as well, and the first record of a session with no usable account mints one. The identity still comes from the harness payload and never from the model, which is why this is a hook rather than something the record host offers: the Model Context Protocol carries no verified caller identity, so a tool that let a session register itself would let a model claim to be any session.

Setup #

  • `mkcert` is declined. It installs a certificate authority into a person's
    trust store, which is the most invasive thing this command could do, and
    it destroys the value of the test it exists for: a third-party client
    either holds that authority, in which case its trust path is not the one
    it uses in production, or it does not, in which case it fails for a
    reason that teaches nothing. No public authority would issue
    `*.agents.localhost` either, so the certificate's shape differs from
    production regardless.
    
    A public wildcard-to-loopback certificate with a published key needs no
    trust store change and works in any client, but it forces somebody else's
    hostname suffix — so the zone differs from production, so the `did:web`
    values differ, and the DID is the field everything downstream keys on.
    
    That leaves the delegated development subzone, the only one where local
    is identical to production, and it needs a DNS credential on a developer
    laptop that [deployment](../docs/deployment.md) says should not sit
    beside the signing keys. It waits for a zone.
    
    Nothing is blocked on this. TLS is load-bearing for
    [pds-xrpc](pds-xrpc.md), which is `blocked`, and for [oauth](oauth.md).
    Plain HTTP over `*.localhost` stays the default, because it works
    offline, in seconds, and with no secret.
    

The parts that are not the server #

Working in it #

Done #