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source dump of claude code forked from oppi.li/claude-code
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8.9 kB · 242 lines
TypeScript
at main
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106107108109110111112113114115116117118119120121122123124125126127128129130131132133134135136137138139140141142143144145146147148149150151152153154155156157158159160161162163164165166167168169170171172173174175176177178179180181182183184185186187188189190191192193194195196197198199200201202203204205206207208209210211212213214215216217218219220221222223224225226227228229230231232233234235236237238239240241242243import axios from 'axios'import type { HookEvent } from 'src/entrypoints/agentSdkTypes.js'import { createCombinedAbortSignal } from '../combinedAbortSignal.js'import { logForDebugging } from '../debug.js'import { errorMessage } from '../errors.js'import { getProxyUrl, shouldBypassProxy } from '../proxy.js'// Import as namespace so spyOn works in tests (direct imports bypass spies)import * as settingsModule from '../settings/settings.js'import type { HttpHook } from '../settings/types.js'import { ssrfGuardedLookup } from './ssrfGuard.js'
const DEFAULT_HTTP_HOOK_TIMEOUT_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000 // 10 minutes (matches TOOL_HOOK_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT_MS)
/** * Get the sandbox proxy config for routing HTTP hook requests through the * sandbox network proxy when sandboxing is enabled. * * Uses dynamic import to avoid a static import cycle * (sandbox-adapter -> settings -> ... -> hooks -> execHttpHook). */async function getSandboxProxyConfig(): Promise< { host: string; port: number; protocol: string } | undefined> { const { SandboxManager } = await import('../sandbox/sandbox-adapter.js')
if (!SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled()) { return undefined }
// Wait for the sandbox network proxy to finish initializing. In REPL mode, // SandboxManager.initialize() is fire-and-forget so the proxy may not be // ready yet when the first hook fires. await SandboxManager.waitForNetworkInitialization()
const proxyPort = SandboxManager.getProxyPort() if (!proxyPort) { return undefined }
return { host: '127.0.0.1', port: proxyPort, protocol: 'http' }}
/** * Read HTTP hook allowlist restrictions from merged settings (all sources). * Follows the allowedMcpServers precedent: arrays concatenate across sources. * When allowManagedHooksOnly is set in managed settings, only admin-defined * hooks run anyway, so no separate lock-down boolean is needed here. */function getHttpHookPolicy(): { allowedUrls: string[] | undefined allowedEnvVars: string[] | undefined} { const settings = settingsModule.getInitialSettings() return { allowedUrls: settings.allowedHttpHookUrls, allowedEnvVars: settings.httpHookAllowedEnvVars, }}
/** * Match a URL against a pattern with * as a wildcard (any characters). * Same semantics as the MCP server allowlist patterns. */function urlMatchesPattern(url: string, pattern: string): boolean { const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&') const regexStr = escaped.replace(/\*/g, '.*') return new RegExp(`^${regexStr}$`).test(url)}
/** * Strip CR, LF, and NUL bytes from a header value to prevent HTTP header * injection (CRLF injection) via env var values or hook-configured header * templates. A malicious env var like "token\r\nX-Evil: 1" would otherwise * inject a second header into the request. */function sanitizeHeaderValue(value: string): string { // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex return value.replace(/[\r\n\x00]/g, '')}
/** * Interpolate $VAR_NAME and ${VAR_NAME} patterns in a string using process.env, * but only for variable names present in the allowlist. References to variables * not in the allowlist are replaced with empty strings to prevent exfiltration * of secrets via project-configured HTTP hooks. * * The result is sanitized to strip CR/LF/NUL bytes to prevent header injection. */function interpolateEnvVars( value: string, allowedEnvVars: ReadonlySet<string>,): string { const interpolated = value.replace( /\$\{([A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*)\}|\$([A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*)/g, (_, braced, unbraced) => { const varName = braced ?? unbraced if (!allowedEnvVars.has(varName)) { logForDebugging( `Hooks: env var $${varName} not in allowedEnvVars, skipping interpolation`, { level: 'warn' }, ) return '' } return process.env[varName] ?? '' }, ) return sanitizeHeaderValue(interpolated)}
/** * Execute an HTTP hook by POSTing the hook input JSON to the configured URL. * Returns the raw response for the caller to interpret. * * When sandboxing is enabled, requests are routed through the sandbox network * proxy which enforces the domain allowlist. The proxy returns HTTP 403 for * blocked domains. * * Header values support $VAR_NAME and ${VAR_NAME} env var interpolation so that * secrets (e.g. "Authorization: Bearer $MY_TOKEN") are not stored in settings.json. * Only env vars explicitly listed in the hook's `allowedEnvVars` array are resolved; * all other references are replaced with empty strings. */export async function execHttpHook( hook: HttpHook, _hookEvent: HookEvent, jsonInput: string, signal?: AbortSignal,): Promise<{ ok: boolean statusCode?: number body: string error?: string aborted?: boolean}> { // Enforce URL allowlist before any I/O. Follows allowedMcpServers semantics: // undefined → no restriction; [] → block all; non-empty → must match a pattern. const policy = getHttpHookPolicy() if (policy.allowedUrls !== undefined) { const matched = policy.allowedUrls.some(p => urlMatchesPattern(hook.url, p)) if (!matched) { const msg = `HTTP hook blocked: ${hook.url} does not match any pattern in allowedHttpHookUrls` logForDebugging(msg, { level: 'warn' }) return { ok: false, body: '', error: msg } } }
const timeoutMs = hook.timeout ? hook.timeout * 1000 : DEFAULT_HTTP_HOOK_TIMEOUT_MS
const { signal: combinedSignal, cleanup } = createCombinedAbortSignal( signal, { timeoutMs }, )
try { // Build headers with env var interpolation in values const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', } if (hook.headers) { // Intersect hook's allowedEnvVars with policy allowlist when policy is set const hookVars = hook.allowedEnvVars ?? [] const effectiveVars = policy.allowedEnvVars !== undefined ? hookVars.filter(v => policy.allowedEnvVars!.includes(v)) : hookVars const allowedEnvVars = new Set(effectiveVars) for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(hook.headers)) { headers[name] = interpolateEnvVars(value, allowedEnvVars) } }
// Route through sandbox network proxy when available. The proxy enforces // the domain allowlist and returns 403 for blocked domains. const sandboxProxy = await getSandboxProxyConfig()
// Detect env var proxy (HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY, respecting NO_PROXY). // When set, configureGlobalAgents() has already installed a request // interceptor that sets httpsAgent to an HttpsProxyAgent — the proxy // handles DNS for the target. Skip the SSRF guard in that case, same // as we do for the sandbox proxy, so that we don't accidentally block // a corporate proxy sitting on a private IP (e.g. 10.0.0.1:3128). const envProxyActive = !sandboxProxy && getProxyUrl() !== undefined && !shouldBypassProxy(hook.url)
if (sandboxProxy) { logForDebugging( `Hooks: HTTP hook POST to ${hook.url} (via sandbox proxy :${sandboxProxy.port})`, ) } else if (envProxyActive) { logForDebugging( `Hooks: HTTP hook POST to ${hook.url} (via env-var proxy)`, ) } else { logForDebugging(`Hooks: HTTP hook POST to ${hook.url}`) }
const response = await axios.post<string>(hook.url, jsonInput, { headers, signal: combinedSignal, responseType: 'text', validateStatus: () => true, maxRedirects: 0, // Explicit false prevents axios's own env-var proxy detection; when an // env-var proxy is configured, the global axios interceptor installed // by configureGlobalAgents() handles it via httpsAgent instead. proxy: sandboxProxy ?? false, // SSRF guard: validate resolved IPs, block private/link-local ranges // (but allow loopback for local dev). Skipped when any proxy is in // use — the proxy performs DNS for the target, and applying the // guard would instead validate the proxy's own IP, breaking // connections to corporate proxies on private networks. lookup: sandboxProxy || envProxyActive ? undefined : ssrfGuardedLookup, })
cleanup()
const body = response.data ?? '' logForDebugging( `Hooks: HTTP hook response status ${response.status}, body length ${body.length}`, )
return { ok: response.status >= 200 && response.status < 300, statusCode: response.status, body, } } catch (error) { cleanup()
if (combinedSignal.aborted) { return { ok: false, body: '', aborted: true } }
const errorMsg = errorMessage(error) logForDebugging(`Hooks: HTTP hook error: ${errorMsg}`, { level: 'error' }) return { ok: false, body: '', error: errorMsg } }}