diff --git a/src/plugin/__tests__/obsidian-stubs-html.test.ts b/src/plugin/__tests__/obsidian-stubs-html.test.ts
index 82e30645..d62ab065 100644
--- a/src/plugin/__tests__/obsidian-stubs-html.test.ts
+++ b/src/plugin/__tests__/obsidian-stubs-html.test.ts
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // src/plugin/__tests__/obsidian-stubs-html.test.ts
 import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
-import { htmlToMarkdown, MarkdownRenderer } from '../obsidian-stubs'
+import { htmlToMarkdown, sanitizeHTMLToDom, MarkdownRenderer } from '../obsidian-stubs'
 // Realm-identity: htmlToMarkdown must be the same function reference whether
 // imported via the ESM `obsidian-compat` virtual module path or the CJS
 // `loader/plugin-api-global` shim. Drift here means plugins loaded by
@@ -386,6 +386,415 @@ describe('htmlToMarkdown', () => {
   })
 })
 
+describe('sanitizeHTMLToDom', () => {
+  describe('basic functionality', () => {
+    it('returns a DocumentFragment', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<p>hello</p>')
+      expect(result).toBeInstanceOf(DocumentFragment)
+    })
+
+    it('preserves safe HTML content', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<p>Hello <strong>world</strong></p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.innerHTML).toBe('<p>Hello <strong>world</strong></p>')
+    })
+
+    it('handles empty string input', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('')
+      expect(result).toBeInstanceOf(DocumentFragment)
+      expect(result.childNodes.length).toBe(0)
+    })
+
+    it('handles null input defensively', () => {
+      // @ts-expect-error testing runtime guard for null
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom(null)
+      expect(result).toBeInstanceOf(DocumentFragment)
+      expect(result.childNodes.length).toBe(0)
+    })
+
+    it('handles undefined input defensively', () => {
+      // @ts-expect-error testing runtime guard for undefined
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom(undefined)
+      expect(result).toBeInstanceOf(DocumentFragment)
+      expect(result.childNodes.length).toBe(0)
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('dangerous element removal', () => {
+    it('removes script elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<p>before</p><script>alert("xss")</script><p>after</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.innerHTML).toBe('<p>before</p><p>after</p>')
+      expect(div.querySelector('script')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes style elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<p>text</p><style>.x { color: red; }</style>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.innerHTML).toBe('<p>text</p>')
+      expect(div.querySelector('style')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes iframe elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<div>safe</div><iframe src="evil.html"></iframe>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('iframe')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes object elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<object data="flash.swf"></object><p>text</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('object')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes embed elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<embed src="file.swf"><p>text</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('embed')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes base elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<base href="http://evil.com/"><p>text</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('base')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes meta elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=evil.html"><p>text</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('meta')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes template elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<template><script>alert(1)</script></template><p>text</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('template')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes math elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<math><maction>x</maction></math><p>text</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('math')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes frame elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<frame src="evil.html"><p>text</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('frame')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes frameset elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<frameset><frame src="a.html"></frameset><p>text</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('frameset')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes noscript elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<noscript><script>alert(1)</script></noscript><p>text</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('noscript')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes link elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<link rel="stylesheet" href="evil.css"><p>text</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('link')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('handles deeply nested dangerous content', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<div><div><div><script>alert(1)</script></div></div></div><p>safe</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('script')).toBeNull()
+      expect(div.innerHTML).toContain('safe')
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('dangerous attribute removal', () => {
+    it('removes onclick handlers', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<button onclick="alert(\'xss\')">Click me</button>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('button')?.hasAttribute('onclick')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes onerror handlers', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<img src="x" onerror="alert(\'xss\')">')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('img')?.hasAttribute('onerror')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes onload handlers', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<img src="valid.png" onload="alert(\'loaded\')">')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('img')?.hasAttribute('onload')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes onmouseover handlers', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<div onmouseover="evil()">Hover me</div>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('div')?.hasAttribute('onmouseover')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes onpointerdown handlers (touch/pointer events)', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<div onpointerdown="evil()">Touch me</div>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('div')?.hasAttribute('onpointerdown')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes ontouchstart handlers', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<div ontouchstart="evil()">Touch me</div>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('div')?.hasAttribute('ontouchstart')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes onanimationstart handlers', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<div onanimationstart="evil()">Animate</div>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('div')?.hasAttribute('onanimationstart')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes formaction attribute', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<button formaction="evil.html">Submit</button>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('button')?.hasAttribute('formaction')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes srcdoc attribute', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<iframe srcdoc="<script>alert(1)</script>"></iframe>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      // iframe is removed entirely, but let's also test srcdoc on an element that stays
+      const result2 = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<div srcdoc="test"></div>')
+      const div2 = document.createElement('div')
+      div2.appendChild(result2)
+      expect(div2.querySelector('div')?.hasAttribute('srcdoc')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('preserves safe attributes', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<a href="https://example.com" class="link" id="mylink">Link</a>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      const anchor = div.querySelector('a')
+      expect(anchor?.getAttribute('href')).toBe('https://example.com')
+      expect(anchor?.getAttribute('class')).toBe('link')
+      expect(anchor?.getAttribute('id')).toBe('mylink')
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('javascript: URL sanitization', () => {
+    it('removes javascript: href', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<a href="javascript:alert(\'xss\')">Click</a>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('a')?.hasAttribute('href')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes javascript: href with whitespace', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<a href="  javascript:alert(\'xss\')">Click</a>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('a')?.hasAttribute('href')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes data:text/html src', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<img src="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('img')?.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('preserves safe data: URLs', () => {
+      // ">')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('img')?.getAttribute('src')).toBe('')
+    })
+
+    it('removes vbscript: URLs', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<a href="vbscript:msgbox(1)">Click</a>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('a')?.hasAttribute('href')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes data:image/svg+xml (can contain scripts)', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<img src="data:image/svg+xml,<svg onload=alert(1)>">')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('img')?.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes data:application/xhtml+xml', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<a href="data:application/xhtml+xml,<script>alert(1)</script>">Click</a>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('a')?.hasAttribute('href')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes javascript: from poster attribute', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<video poster="javascript:alert(1)"></video>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('video')?.hasAttribute('poster')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes javascript: from cite attribute', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<blockquote cite="javascript:alert(1)">quote</blockquote>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('blockquote')?.hasAttribute('cite')).toBe(false)
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('SVG sanitization', () => {
+    it('removes script elements inside SVG', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('script')).toBeNull()
+      // SVG itself should remain
+      expect(div.querySelector('svg')).not.toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes onload handlers on SVG elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<svg onload="alert(1)"><rect/></svg>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('svg')?.hasAttribute('onload')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes foreignObject inside SVG', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<svg><foreignObject><div onclick="evil()">content</div></foreignObject></svg>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('foreignObject')).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('removes href from SVG use elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<svg><use href="external.svg#icon"></use></svg>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      const useEl = div.querySelector('use')
+      expect(useEl).not.toBeNull()
+      expect(useEl?.hasAttribute('href')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes xlink:href from SVG use elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<svg><use xlink:href="external.svg#icon"></use></svg>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      const useEl = div.querySelector('use')
+      expect(useEl).not.toBeNull()
+      expect(useEl?.hasAttribute('xlink:href')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes javascript: href from SVG a elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<svg><a href="javascript:alert(1)"><text>click</text></a></svg>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      const anchor = div.querySelector('a')
+      expect(anchor).not.toBeNull()
+      expect(anchor?.hasAttribute('href')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('removes javascript: xlink:href from SVG a elements', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<svg><a xlink:href="javascript:alert(1)"><text>click</text></a></svg>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      const anchor = div.querySelector('a')
+      expect(anchor).not.toBeNull()
+      expect(anchor?.hasAttribute('xlink:href')).toBe(false)
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('case sensitivity', () => {
+    it('handles uppercase SCRIPT tags', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<SCRIPT>alert(1)</SCRIPT><p>text</p>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('script')).toBeNull()
+      expect(div.innerHTML).toBe('<p>text</p>')
+    })
+
+    it('handles uppercase event handlers', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<div ONCLICK="evil()">Click</div>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('div')?.hasAttribute('onclick')).toBe(false)
+      expect(div.querySelector('div')?.hasAttribute('ONCLICK')).toBe(false)
+    })
+
+    it('handles uppercase JAVASCRIPT: protocol', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom('<a HREF="JAVASCRIPT:alert(1)">Click</a>')
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      expect(div.querySelector('a')?.hasAttribute('href')).toBe(false)
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('complex HTML structures', () => {
+    it('handles nested elements with mixed dangerous content', () => {
+      const html = `
+        <div>
+          <p onclick="evil()">Safe text</p>
+          <script>bad()</script>
+          <span>More safe text</span>
+        </div>
+      `
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom(html)
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      
+      expect(div.querySelector('script')).toBeNull()
+      expect(div.querySelector('p')?.hasAttribute('onclick')).toBe(false)
+      expect(div.textContent).toContain('Safe text')
+      expect(div.textContent).toContain('More safe text')
+    })
+
+    it('handles multiple dangerous elements', () => {
+      const html = '<script>1</script><style>2</style><iframe>3</iframe><p>safe</p>'
+      const result = sanitizeHTMLToDom(html)
+      const div = document.createElement('div')
+      div.appendChild(result)
+      
+      expect(div.querySelector('script')).toBeNull()
+      expect(div.querySelector('style')).toBeNull()
+      expect(div.querySelector('iframe')).toBeNull()
+      expect(div.innerHTML).toBe('<p>safe</p>')
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('realm identity', () => {
+    it('obsidian-compat re-exports the same sanitizeHTMLToDom reference', () => {
+      // Import from obsidian-compat to verify the export works correctly
+      expect(obsidianCompat.sanitizeHTMLToDom).toBe(sanitizeHTMLToDom)
+    })
+  })
+})
+
 describe('MarkdownRenderer', () => {
   it('renderMarkdown renders markdown to HTML', async () => {
     const el = document.createElement('div')
diff --git a/src/plugin/loader/plugin-api-global.ts b/src/plugin/loader/plugin-api-global.ts
index 3c2cb68a..2c5aad00 100644
--- a/src/plugin/loader/plugin-api-global.ts
+++ b/src/plugin/loader/plugin-api-global.ts
@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ import {
   // import from 'reams' instead.
   Platform,
   htmlToMarkdown,
+  sanitizeHTMLToDom,
   MarkdownRenderer,
   // Bases utility functions and value types (Obsidian 1.10.0+)
   BasesEntry,
@@ -584,6 +585,7 @@ const pluginApi: Record<string, unknown> = {
   Platform,
   moment: momentLib,
   htmlToMarkdown,
+  sanitizeHTMLToDom,
   MarkdownRenderer,
   // Bases utility functions and value types (Obsidian 1.10.0+)
   BasesEntry,
diff --git a/src/plugin/obsidian-compat/index.ts b/src/plugin/obsidian-compat/index.ts
index 0c130188..ca76393c 100644
--- a/src/plugin/obsidian-compat/index.ts
+++ b/src/plugin/obsidian-compat/index.ts
@@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ export {
   Scope,
   Keymap,
   htmlToMarkdown,
+  sanitizeHTMLToDom,
   MarkdownRenderer,
   // Search helpers (Obsidian-compatible)
   prepareFuzzySearch,
diff --git a/src/plugin/obsidian-stubs.ts b/src/plugin/obsidian-stubs.ts
index 01f3c68e..8c711385 100644
--- a/src/plugin/obsidian-stubs.ts
+++ b/src/plugin/obsidian-stubs.ts
@@ -5605,6 +5605,165 @@ export function htmlToMarkdown(html: string | HTMLElement | DocumentFragment | D
   return turndownService.turndown(html)
 }
 
+/**
+ * Dangerous HTML elements to remove during sanitization.
+ * Includes both HTML and SVG dangerous elements.
+ * @internal
+ */
+const SANITIZE_REMOVE_ELEMENTS = new Set([
+  'script',
+  'style',
+  'iframe',
+  'frame',
+  'frameset',
+  'object',
+  'embed',
+  'applet',
+  'noscript',
+  'base',
+  'meta',
+  'link',
+  'template', // Template content becomes active when cloned
+  'math', // MathML can contain scripts
+])
+
+/**
+ * Dangerous URL protocols to remove from href/src/action/xlink:href attributes.
+ * @internal
+ */
+const DANGEROUS_URL_PROTOCOLS = [
+  'javascript:',
+  'vbscript:',
+  'data:text/html',
+  'data:text/javascript',
+  'data:application/javascript',
+  'data:application/xhtml+xml',
+  'data:image/svg+xml', // SVG can contain scripts
+]
+
+/**
+ * Check if an attribute name is an event handler.
+ * Event handlers follow the pattern "on*" (case-insensitive).
+ * @internal
+ */
+function isEventHandlerAttribute(attrName: string): boolean {
+  return attrName.startsWith('on')
+}
+
+/**
+ * Other dangerous attributes that should be removed.
+ * @internal
+ */
+const OTHER_DANGEROUS_ATTRIBUTES = new Set([
+  'formaction', // Can redirect form submissions
+  'srcdoc', // Can contain arbitrary HTML in iframes (though iframes are removed)
+])
+
+/**
+ * Parse and sanitize an HTML string, returning a safe DocumentFragment.
+ *
+ * Mirrors Obsidian's `sanitizeHTMLToDom(html: string): DocumentFragment` signature.
+ *
+ * This function:
+ * - Parses the HTML string using DOMParser
+ * - Removes dangerous elements (script, style, iframe, template, math, etc.)
+ * - Removes ALL event handler attributes (any attribute starting with "on")
+ * - Removes dangerous protocol URLs (javascript:, vbscript:, data:text/html, etc.)
+ * - Handles both HTML and SVG elements
+ * - Returns a DocumentFragment containing the sanitized nodes
+ *
+ * @param html - The HTML string to sanitize. Null/undefined returns empty fragment.
+ * @returns A DocumentFragment containing the sanitized HTML
+ * @public
+ */
+export function sanitizeHTMLToDom(html: string): DocumentFragment {
+  // Defensive guard for null/undefined - plugins are sloppy
+  if (html == null) {
+    return document.createDocumentFragment()
+  }
+
+  // Parse HTML using DOMParser for safe parsing
+  const parser = new DOMParser()
+  const doc = parser.parseFromString(html, 'text/html')
+
+  // Remove dangerous elements - use querySelectorAll to handle namespaces
+  // getElementsByTagName is case-insensitive in HTML and handles SVG elements
+  for (const tagName of SANITIZE_REMOVE_ELEMENTS) {
+    // Use querySelectorAll for namespace-aware selection
+    const elements = doc.body.querySelectorAll(tagName)
+    elements.forEach(el => el.remove())
+  }
+
+  // Handle SVG-specific dangerous elements
+  // foreignObject can contain arbitrary HTML with event handlers
+  // <use> can reference external SVG files that may contain scripts
+  // Note: script elements inside SVG are already handled by SANITIZE_REMOVE_ELEMENTS
+  const foreignObjects = doc.body.querySelectorAll('foreignObject')
+  foreignObjects.forEach(el => el.remove())
+
+  // Remove href/xlink:href from SVG <use> elements (can load external scripts)
+  const useElements = doc.body.querySelectorAll('use')
+  useElements.forEach(el => {
+    el.removeAttribute('href')
+    el.removeAttribute('xlink:href')
+  })
+
+  // Remove dangerous attributes and sanitize URLs
+  // Use querySelectorAll('*') to get all elements including SVG children
+  const allElements = doc.body.querySelectorAll('*')
+  for (const el of allElements) {
+    const attrs = Array.from(el.attributes)
+
+    for (const attr of attrs) {
+      const attrName = attr.name.toLowerCase()
+      // Strip namespace prefixes for checking (e.g., xlink:href -> href)
+      const localName = attrName.includes(':') ? attrName.split(':')[1] : attrName
+
+      // Remove ALL event handlers (any on* attribute)
+      if (isEventHandlerAttribute(localName)) {
+        el.removeAttribute(attr.name)
+        continue
+      }
+
+      // Remove other dangerous attributes
+      if (OTHER_DANGEROUS_ATTRIBUTES.has(localName)) {
+        el.removeAttribute(attr.name)
+        continue
+      }
+
+      // Sanitize URL attributes for dangerous protocols
+      // Check both regular and xlink: variants
+      // Include all attributes that can contain URLs
+      if (
+        localName === 'href' ||
+        localName === 'src' ||
+        localName === 'action' ||
+        localName === 'poster' || // <video poster>
+        localName === 'data' || // <object data>
+        localName === 'codebase' || // legacy <object>/<applet>
+        localName === 'cite' || // <blockquote cite>, <q cite>
+        localName === 'background' || // deprecated but still works
+        localName === 'dynsrc' || // legacy IE
+        localName === 'lowsrc' // legacy
+      ) {
+        const value = attr.value.trim().toLowerCase()
+        const isDangerous = DANGEROUS_URL_PROTOCOLS.some(protocol => value.startsWith(protocol))
+        if (isDangerous) {
+          el.removeAttribute(attr.name)
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Create a DocumentFragment and move all body children into it
+  const fragment = document.createDocumentFragment()
+  while (doc.body.firstChild) {
+    fragment.appendChild(doc.body.firstChild)
+  }
+
+  return fragment
+}
+
 /**
  * MarkdownRenderer — abstract base class for markdown rendering views.
  *